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Abstract
We consider a situation, in which a regulator believes that constraining a good,
created jointly by competitive agents, is socially desirable. Individual levels of out-
puts, which generate the constrained amount, can be computed as a Pareto-e±cient
solution of the agents' joint utility maximisation problem. However, generically, a
Pareto-e±cient solution is not an equilibrium. We suggest the regulator should
calculate a Nash-Rosen coupled-constraint equilibrium (or a \generalised" Nash
equilibrium) and use the coupled-constraint Lagrange multiplier to formulate a
threat, under which the agents would play a decoupled Nash game. An equilibrium
of this game will possibly coincide with the Pareto-e±cient solution. We focus on
situations when the constraint is saturated, and examine under which conditions a
match between an equilibrium and a Pareto solution is possible. We illustrate our
¯ndings using a model for a coordination problem, in which ¯rms' outputs depend
on each other and where the output levels are important for the regulator.
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The aim of this paper1 is twofold. First, we want to formulate su±cient conditions,
under which a two-player concave game with coupled constraints has an equilibrium
µ a la Rosen (see Rosen (1965)) that is also a Pareto-optimal solution of a centralised
problem. In that we apply Aumann's idea of game engineering, see Aumann, R.
J. (2008) i.e., we want to construct a game whose equilibrium coincides with a
prescribed outcome. Secondly, we want to illustrate this result by analysing a
stylised real-life game where two competitive players contribute to a public good.
We also want to contribute to welfare economics. We contend that our work is
inspired by the second welfare theorem2. As known, lump-sum transfers that are
required for the implementation of an e±cient outcome, are di±cult to arrange.
Also, economies are often composed of agents that exert externalities on each other
and their outputs are subjected to constraints imposed externally (e.g., by social or
environmental pressure groups). None of the above features has been included in
the welfare theorems' speci¯cation. Our results, obtained for a two-agent economy,
overcome these shortcomings: (1) the agents are allowed to interact through exter-
nalities (including negative), (2) the regulator seeks an e±cient outcome subject to
a constraint and (3) an e±cient outcome is obtained through the threat of nominal
(never collected) taxes.
More speci¯cally, we are interested in situations, in which a regulator wants
to control competitive agents so that their jointly created externality satis¯es con-
straints. Typically, the constraints correspond to exogenous standards and concern
the combined strategy space of all players.. The constraints can be imposed from
above (e.g., on pollution emitted by a cluster of pulp mills, see e.g., Haurie and
Krawczyk (1997) or Krawczyk (2005) or by thermal generators, see e.g., Contreras
et al. (2007)), or from below e.g., on the amount of some public good like trans-
portation capacity or hospital beds, available to a local population. The former
constraints concern a negative externality, which needs to be restricted; the latter
are imposed to satisfy a level deemed necessary.
Also, problems involving competition for a scarce resource, demanded by inde-
pendent operators that depend on some legislation (like private ¯shermen operating
1This paper draws from and extends Krawczyk and Tidball (2009).
2See e.g. Groves, T. and Ledyard, J. (1977). Brie°y, the two welfare theorems assert that
under suitable conditions: (i) every competitive allocation is Pareto-e±cient and (ii) every Pareto-
e±cient allocation is competitive for some distribution of endownements, realisable through trans-
fers.
2on a ¯shery or internet users logging in to a server, see e.g., Kesselman et al. (2005))
can be analysed using the same framework and are thus of interest to us.
In all these situations the joint restrictions are likely to be saturated. This
might be because agents' individually optimal solutions limit the amount of the
positive externality, because not emitting negative externality is costly or because
the contested resources are scarce. Notice that if the constraints had some slack,
there would be \no problem" for the regulator3. In this paper, we will assume that
the regulator is dealing with the \interesting" case of saturated constraints and
wishes to know how to apportion the responsibility for the constraints' satisfaction
among the agents so that an equilibrium is achieved.
Individual levels of outputs (and inputs) that generate the desired amount of
the externality can be computed as a Pareto-e±cient constrained solution to the
agents' joint utility maximisation problem. The regulator might use an arbitrary
weight ® 2 (0; 1) to balance the agents' utility functions or seek ^ ® that maximises
the sum.
As known, generically, a Pareto-e±cient solution is not an equilibrium hence not
self-enforcing, thus of problematic use in a competitive environment. We suggest
the regulator calculates a Rosen coupled-constraint equilibrium (Nash normalised),
see e.g., Rosen (1965) or Krawczyk (2005), (or a \generalised" Nash equilibrium
as this type of equilibrium is called in e.g., Pang and Fukushima (2005)) and uses
the coupled-constraint Lagrange multiplier to formulate a threat, under which the
agents will play a decoupled Nash game. An equilibrium of this game will possibly
coincide with the desired Pareto-e±cient constrained solution. If so, the Pareto
outcome will be achieved as a Nash equilibrium, hence self-enforcing.
In the paper, we examine, under which conditions a match between those two
solutions is possible. This is the line of research started in Tidball and Zaccour
(2005). Here, we generalise the results obtained in the above paper for an envi-
ronmental problem. We illustrate our ¯ndings using a model for a coordination
problem, in which ¯rms' outputs depend on each other and where the output levels
are important for the regulator.
The model considered in this paper is deterministic and information is \sym-
metric". We notice that should any of these assumptions not be satis¯ed, the
regulator might assign penalty functions that would prompt the agents to produce
the externality amounts that are not optimal for the agents. If so, they would start
trading out the excess amounts until they became individually optimal. However,
3Unless the regulator would like to improve welfare from a status quo situation.
3such a trading problem surpasses the scope of this paper.
What follows is a brief outline of what this paper contains. In Section 2, we
describe a model in which two ¯rm outputs are coordinated by a regulator. This
motivates our search for a map between Patero-e±cient solutions and competitive
equilibria. In Sections 3 and 4, we develop the solution concepts for the coordination
problem and revise the mathematics needed for the uniqueness of equilibrium. We
develop the su±cient conditions for the map's existence in Section 5. We apply
these conditions to the motivating example in Section 6. The concluding remarks
summarise our ¯ndings, which include a socio-economic interpretation of the results.
2 A \public" good delivery
The mathematics of the model described below is taken from the seminal paper by
Rosen (1965). The interpretations and intuitions are ours.
2.1 A model
Consider two competitive agents whose outputs are x1 ¸ 0 and x2 ¸ 0, respectively.






2 of the second.
The revenue of the ¯rst agent can only be created using the second agent's
output (positive externality) and, in this case, it equals x1x2. However, the goods
produced by the second agent \su®er" when are utilised by the ¯rst agent (negative
externality) so, the revenue of the second agent is ¡x1x2.

















g1(x) = x1 ¸ 0
g2(x) = x2 ¸ 0
9
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > > > > > > ;
(1)
\played" among the agents is (0,0).
However, maintaining some positive combination of levels x1 and x2 may be
important for the regulator. Mathematically, the regulator may want the outputs
4to satisfy
h(x) = x1 + x2 ¡ 1 ¸ 0: (2)
Throughout this paper Ái(x); i = 1;2 are assumed continuous in all arguments
and concave in xi. The common constraint h(¢) will then be assumed such that the
constraint set
x 2 X ´ f(x1;x2) : x1 ¸ 0;x2(x) ¸ 0;h(x) ¸ 0g (3)
is a convex, closed and bounded subset of IR
2.
The problem of how to entice the agents to satisfy constraint (2) boils down
into two subproblems:
a. What should be the levels of x1 and x2?
b. What should the regulator do to induce the players to choose these levels?
Brie°y, the levels x1 and x2 can be established as a (constrained) Pareto-e±cient
solution and implemented as Rosen (Nash normalised) equilibrium of a decoupled
game (to be de¯ned). In the rest of this paper we study the mathematical conditions
that Á1(¢), Á2(¢) and h(¢) need to satisfy for the Pareto and Rosen solutions to exist
and coincide.
2.2 Interpretations and intuitions
To focus attention we suggest that the above mathematical problem can have the
following socio-economic origin.
Consider a rail network owned by a public ¯rm and a private ¯rm responsible
for rolling stock and transportation.
Let x1 be the tonnage of the goods transported through the network; let x2 be
the length of the tracks owned by the tracks' owner. The revenue of the transporta-
tion ¯rm is proportional to the tonnage and to the tracks' length ¯1x1 x2.
In absence of a discount price for super-large trains, perhaps due to an imperfect
state of the tracks, a reasonable approximation of the cost function to the trans-




: the more goods to transport, the more hardware
needs to be maintained.





whose combination approximates the ¯rm's pro¯t Á1(x).
The public ¯rm operating the tracks is paid a ¯xed amount, which is normalised
to zero. The costs of maintaining the tracks at level x2 is ¯2x1x2+®2x2
2 (where the
5¯rst term is motivated by the destruction caused by tonnage x1). Hence Á2(x) =
¡®2x2
2 ¡ ¯2x1x2.
For social reasons, the government wants transportation activity °1x1 +°2x2 to
be above level M. This can be written as °1x1 + °2x2 ¡ M ¸ 0.
The above provides motivation for model (1), (2), in which ®1 = ®2 = ¯1 =
¯2 = °1 = °2 = M = 1.
3 Solution concepts
3.1 Pareto-e±cient constrained solutions
We will establish a solution to question (a.) from Section 2.1 i.e., we will compute
what output levels the regulator may want the agents to produce.
Consider model (1), (2).
The regulator is typically interested in a Pareto-e±cient solution ^ x =
¡
^ x1; ^ x2
¢
i.e., such that
if Ái(x1; ^ x2) > Ái(^ x1; ^ x2) then Á¡i(x1; ^ x2) < Á¡i(^ x1; ^ x2) i = 1;2 (4)
where the subindex ¡i indicates the player.








f®Á1(x) + (1 ¡ ®)Á2(x)g : (5)
To stress that ^ x depends on ® we will write ^ x(®) =
¡
^ x1(®); ^ x2(®)
¢
. Notice that
the larger ®, the more importance that regulator assigns to the payo® of the ¯rst
player. We can say that ® is a marginal rate of substitution between the two players'
payo®s.
If there is no particular reason for the regulator to prefer one speci¯c value of
®, solving the following problem will deliver the \best" ^ ® and the best output pair
¡
^ x1(^ ®); ^ x2(^ ®)
¢
^ ® = arg max
®2(0;1)
f®Á(^ x1(®); ^ x2(®)) + (1 ¡ ®)Á(^ x1(®); ^ x2(®))g : (6)
In this paper we assume that the regulator is interested not (only) in ^ ® and the
corresponding outputs and payo®s but (also) in the full array of Pareto-e±cient
solutions
¡
^ x1(®); ^ x2(®)
¢
and the corresponding payo®s Ái(^ x1(®); ^ x2(®)); i = 1;2.
This helps answer question (a.) from Section 2.1.
63.2 Coupled constraints equilibria
Rosen Rosen (1965) introduced coupled constraints equilibrium (CCE), also known
as generalised Nash equilibrium (see e.g., Harker (1991) or Pang and Fukushima
(2005)) for games with constraints in the combined strategy space of all agents. In
these games, the regulator may seek a solution that can be adopted by competitive
players and such that guarantees ful¯lment of the constraints, which depend on
the actions undertaken by all agents. For the history of this solution concept and
examples of use see Rosen (1965), Haurie (1994), Haurie and Krawczyk (1997),
Krawczyk (2007) and Drouet et al. (2008); also Pang and Fukushima (2005).
We will exploit the CCE politico-economic appeal. Once the regulator estab-
lishes a desired CCE (explained below), the equilibrium implementation is straight-
forward. The equilibrium Karush-Kuhn-Tucker multipliers associated with the joint
constraints need be used as penalty tax rates for the constraints' violation and the
players have to allow for these penalties in their payo®s. The players will then
\play" a decoupled game whose solution coincides with the desired equilibrium.
Knowledge that a CCE exists and is unique is crucial for the above enticement
mechanism. It su±ces to say that without the equilibrium uniqueness, the tax
e®ectiveness could not be established. However, in general, there is a plethora of
equilibria when joint actions of the players are restricted.
Rosen Rosen (1965) allows for a discriminatory treatment of players through
the introduction of weights ri > 0; i = 1;2, with which the regulator can appraise
each agent's payo® (e.g., from a view point of the community). On the other hand,
the weights help control which equilibrium is established. This is so because, given
su±cient concavity of the payo®s, an equilibrium that corresponds to a particular
r = [r1; r2] is unique. (We notice that one of them may be the Pareto-e±cient
solution
¡
^ x1(®); ^ x2(®)
¢
.)
The main role of the weighs in controlling the agents' behaviour is that they
can modify the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker multipliers and adjust the tax rates among
players to entice them to choose actions that lead to a desired equilibrium outcome.
Below we will review the mathematics of CCE and its implementation, including
the uniqueness conditions; for details see Rosen (1965), Haurie (1994) or Krawczyk
(2007).
74 Existence and uniqueness of coupled constraints
equilibrium
We will adopt the literature results to the two-person game (1) with one joint
constraint (2). For the proofs see Rosen (1965).
4.1 Introductory remarks
The solution to game (1) with the joint constraint (2) can be written as
x
¤ = equilyijx¤
¡i2X fÁ1(x);Á2(x)g ; (7)







¡i); i = 1;2 (8)
where yijx¡i ´ (yi;x¡i) denotes a collection of actions when the i-th agent \tries"
yi while the other agent is playing x¡i;i = 1;2.
At x¤ no player can improve their own payo® by a unilateral change in his
(or her) strategy, which keeps the combined vector in X ½ IR
2. In general, the
strategy set X is assumed a convex, closed and bounded subset of IR
2 and X ´
f(x1;x2) : x1 ¸ 0;x2 ¸ 0;x1 + x2 ¸ Mg, as in (3).
Game (7) shall be called a coupled constraints game (µ a la Rosen, see Rosen
(1965)). The coupling refers to the fact that one player's action a®ects what the
other players' actions can be. In the special case where X = X1 £ X2 i.e., each
player's action is individually constrained, the game is said to have uncoupled con-
straints.
If each payo® function Ái is multiplied by weight ri > 0, then
x
¤(r) = equilyijx¤
¡i2X fr1Á1(x);r2Á2(x)g ; (9)
where r = [r1; r2] 2 IR
2
+. Our aim is to examine when x¤(r) can match ^ x(®) for a
given ® 2 (0; 1).
4.2 De¯nition
We know from Rosen (1965)4 that an equilibrium exists and is unique if the game
is diagonally strictly concave (DSC).
4Also see Krawczyk et al. (1998) or Krawczyk (2007) for some applications.
8The economic interpretation of DSC is quite simple. A game that is DSC, is one
in which each player has more control over his own payo® than the other players
have over it. This is a desired, and rather common, feature of many economic
models.
Mathematically, let us call f(x;r) ´ r1Á1(x)+r2Á2(x) the joint payo® function.
A (\smooth") game is DSC if the so-called pseudo-Hessian of the joint payo®
function (i.e. Jacobian of pseudo-gradient of f(x;r), see e.g., Rosen (1965) or
Krawczyk et al. (1998)) for the given game is negative de¯nite.
Theorem 4.1. In a game with uncoupled constraints, if the joint payo® function
f(x;r) is DSC for some r > 0, then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium.
When the constraints are coupled, there are no such guarantees, and a special
type of equilibrium must be de¯ned.
For that purpose, assume that the constraint set X is de¯ned through (2). (In
general, X needs to be de¯ned by a collection of concave functions, see Rosen
(1965) or Krawczyk (2007) and such that the constraint quali¯cation conditions
are satis¯ed.)
Denote the constraint shadow price vector for player i by ¸¤
i ¸ 0. Then, x¤ 2 X,
is a coupled constraint equilibrium point if and only if it satis¯es the following
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
h(x











for all i = 1;:::n and where yijx was de¯ned in (7).
The above conditions establish a solution to (7) under the adopted di®erentia-
bility and quali¯cation assumptions. We notice that conditions (10)-(12) de¯ne x¤
as a vector of non improvable strategies if x¤ 2 X, hence Nash.
In general, the multipliers5 ¸1 and ¸2 will not be related to each other. However,
we shall consider a special kind of equilibrium, which can re°ect the di®erent levels
of agent responsibility for the constraint satisfaction (expressed by the vector r)
and is unique.
De¯nition 4.1. An equilibrium point x¤ is a Rosen (Nash normalised 6) equilibrium
point if, for some vectors r > 0 and ¸¤ ¸ 0, conditions (10)-(12) determine x¤ and
5They will be vectors if there were more coupled constraints to satisfy.
6\Normalisation" means in this context that both players face the same constraint shadow











for each i. 7
For shortness we have dropped coupled constraints from the equilibrium de¯ni-
tion.
Now, we can better understand the role of the weights ri. If an agent's weight ri
(see (9)) is greater than those of his (or her) competitors, then his (or her) Lagrange
multipliers are lessened, relative to the competitors'. This means that the marginal
cost of the constraint's violation is lower for this agent than for their competitor.
Paraphrasing, the vector r tells us of how the regulator has distributed the burden
of the constraints' satisfaction among the agents.
The wording of the following theorem crucial for coupled-constraint games is a
bit stronger than in Rosen (1965), see Krawczyk (2002).
Theorem 4.2. Let the weighting ¹ r 2 Q be given where Q is a convex subset of IR
2
+.
Let f(x; ¹ r) be diagonally strictly concave on the convex set X and such that the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker multipliers exist. Then, for the weighting ¹ r, there is a unique
Rosen (Nash normalised) equilibrium point.
In other words, if a game is DSC for a feasible distribution of the constraint's
satisfaction responsibilities, then the game possesses a unique coupled constraint
equilibrium for each such distribution.
4.3 Enforcement through taxation
Here we establish a solution to subproblem (b.) from Section 2.1. In particular, we
explain how speci¯c output levels, including those desired by the regulator, can be
made optimal for the agents.
In Section 3.2 we mentioned a decoupled game that the agents play after the
regulator has modi¯ed their payo®s. The decoupling means that the players de-
cide upon their actions without the explicit knowledge of the common constraint.
Instead, they know the penalty functions for the common constraint violation and
incorporate them in their payo® functions.
The penalty functions Ti(¸¤;ri;x); i = 1;2 contain the tax rate determined by
the Lagrange multiplier obtained as CCE of the constrained game and the constraint
7We could say that ¸¤ are the \objective" shadow prices while ¸¤







where ¸¤ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint and ri is player
i's weight8 that de¯nes their responsibility for the constraint's satisfaction.
Hence, if the weight for player i is, for example ri > 1 and the weight for the
other player is 1, then the responsibility of player i for the constraints' satisfaction
is lessened.
The players' payo® functions, so modi¯ed, will be
Á
i(x) = Ái(x) ¡ Ti(¸
¤;ri;x): (16)
Notice that under this taxation scheme the penalties remain \nominal" (i.e., zero)
if all constraints are satis¯ed.
The Nash equilibrium of the new unconstrained game with payo® functions Á
i






¤¤) 8 i; (17)
(compare with equation (8)).
We can easily see that the equilibrium conditions for x¤¤ are equivalent to (10)-
(12) and conclude that x¤¤ = x¤.(See Krawczyk and Uryasev (2000), Krawczyk
(2005) or Krawczyk (2007) for a discussion and examples).
5 A relationship between Pareto-e±cient solu-
tions and Rosen's equilibria
5.1 Pareto e±ciency ¯rst order conditions
Consider the regulator problem (5) of dealing with two economic agents whose
outputs need to be controlled for social reasons. We repeat the mathematical
model for this problem, which is:
max
x2X
f®Á1(x1;x2) + (1 ¡ ®)Á2(x1;x2)g : (18)
8If the weights r were identical [1;1;:::1] then the penalty term for the constraint is the same
for each player f
Ti(¸¤;1;x) = ¸¤ max(0;¡h(x)): (15)
.
11We will use P(¢;¢) or simply P to refer to the contents of the curly brackets above.
As in Section 2, Ái(¢;¢); i = 1;2 are di®erentiable payo® functions concave in
the player's own decision variable and X is a convex set of output combinations
that the optimal solutions need to satisfy.
We will assume that the regulator is interested in optimal solutions that saturate




P = ®Á1(x1;x2) + (1 ¡ ®)Á2(x1;x2) + ¹h(x1;x2): (19)


























> > > > =
> > > > ;
(20)
Given concavity of the payo® functions and convexity of the constraint set, the
above conditions are also su±cient for a solution ^ x1(®); ^ x2(®) to (20), to be a
Pareto optimal solution to (18).
5.2 Rosen's equilibrium ¯rst order conditions
It is well known that a Pareto optimal (e±cient) solution i.e., the pair x1(®);x2(®)
that solves problem (18) is not a generic Nash equilibrium. Consequently, it does
not have the self-enforcing properties that the latter solution concept enjoys.
On the other hand the regulator knows from Section 4.3 (also, see Haurie and
Krawczyk (1997), Krawczyk (2005) or Krawczyk (2005)) that it is possible to control
competitive agents, who share a common constraint, to satisfy this constraint.
This is achieved through a threat function (14), which results from a CCE. This
equilibrium does possess the features of Nash equilibrium.









> > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > ;
(21)
12where r ¸ 1 is a weight, which the regulator attaches to the ¯rst player's payo®
relative9 to the second player's payo®.
The player Lagrangeans are:
L
R
1 = rÁ1(x1;x2) + ¸h(x1;x2); L
R
2 = Á2(x1;x2) + ¸h(x1;x2): (22)
Following (10)-(12), (13) and when h(x1;x2) = 0, a pair x1(r);x2(r) is a nor-






















> > > > =
> > > > ;
(23)
If the joint payo® function is diagonally strictly concave then the pair x1(r);x2(r),
which satis¯es (23), is the unique normalised (Rosen) equilibrium of game (21), see
Theorem 4.2 .
5.3 Relations between ® and r
We want to ¯nd a relationship between ® and r such that the solutions for the two
problems (Pareto and Rosen) are identical i.e., x¤(r) = ^ x(®).
Assume that
¹ = K¸: (24)
The multipliers ¹ and ¸ need be positive so, if we ¯nd K > 0 that satis¯es this
equation then the regulator will be able to use a Rosen's equilibrium to enforce a
Pareto optimal solution.






















9So, we have scaled r2 = 1 and set r = r1. See Appendix A for a proof that, for the case of
two players, Theorem 4.2 is true when the regulator uses just one r to apprise the ¯rst player's
payo® relative to the second player's, instead of using two \absolute" weights r1 and r2.




























The derivatives in equations (27) and (28) are evaluated at x1(®);x2(®) hence,
r = r(®), K = K(®) i.e., they are functions of ®.
Note that the numerator ®
@Á1
@x1
+ (1 ¡ ®)
@Á2
@x1
in the expression for r (27) can
be negative or zero if Á2(x1;x2) decreases in x1 (i.e., if x1 is a negative externality
in the problem) and if ® is small (i.e., if the second player's payo® is somehow
preferred).
Also, the denominator ®
@Á1
@x2
+ (1 ¡ ®)
@Á2
@x2
can be negative or zero if Á1(x1;x2)
decreases in x2 (i.e., if x2 is a negative externality in a problem) and if ® is large
(i.e., the ¯rst player's payo® is somehow preferred). It follows from the above that
if there are negative externalities, then r(®) can have breaks in domain and attain
negative values that preclude the existence of a Nash equilibrium, which could
implement the desired Pareto solution. We can say that:
Theorem 5.1.
(a) For ® 2 (0; 1) such that a solution to (18) exists with ¸ > 0 and if 0 <
r(®) < 1 the regulator can implement a desired Pareto-e±cient solution as a
Rosen (Nash normalised) equilibrium. In particular, formula (27) determines the
level of responsibility of the ¯rst player for the constraint satisfaction relative to the
level of the second player, for a speci¯c level of ®.
For the situations when there are no negative externalities and when there are
no externalities at all, we have the respective corollaries.
Corollary 5.1. If there are no negative externalities i.e., if
@Ái
@xj
> 0 then 0 <
r(®) < 1. Hence, for a given value of ®, the corresponding Pareto-e±cient solution
can be made optimal for individual agents.
Corollary 5.2. If Ái(xi;xj) = Ái(xi), (Ái concave en xi), then









14has positive determinant and trace negative hence is negative de¯nite. So, the
game is DSC.
² For all ® 2 (0;1) such that a solution to (18) exists with ¸ > 0, there exists





This means that for this case, the set of Rosen equilibria coincides with the
set of Pareto optima with constraints.
In the next section we continue the motivating example from Section 6 of two
agents exerting negative externalities on each other. We will establish the values
of ® such that a solution to (18) exists with ¸ > 0 and that veri¯es 0 < r(®) < 1.
6 Realisation of a public good delivery
We now analyse the public good's delivery model (1), under the delivery condition
(2).
6.1 Does status quo need be modi¯ed?
The regulator needs to establish whether the solution x to the unconstrained game,
presumably \played" at present (hence \status quo"),
x = equil
yijx¡i2IR
2 fÁ1(x);Á2(x)g ; (29)
generates scarcity
x1 + x2 ¡ 1 · 0: (30)
If there is abundance of the joint good x1+x2¡1 > 0, then there is \no problem"10
for the regulator to solve because the constraint is satis¯ed in a Nash equilibrium.
Condition (30) implies that, in a constrained equilibrium, ¸ > 0 if such an equilib-
rium exists.
As we said in Section 2.1, a solution to the unconstrained game (1) is x1 =
0; x2 = 0. This clearly satis¯es (30) hence, the regulator's problem of how to
assure satisfaction of the constraint in an equilibrium is real.
10See footnote 3. In this paper, we assume that the regulator's main concern is the constraint
satisfaction.
156.2 Which Pareto-e±ciency programmes can be enforced
6.2.1 The necessary conditions
The regulator has to verify that the Pareto-e±ciency programme (18) when X =
IR
2, also generates a \scarce" solution i.e., that ^ x1(®) + ^ x2(®) ¡ 1 · 0. This
will imply that once the constraint (2) is enforced, a constrained Pareto-e±cient
solution will be saturated hence ¹ > 0 in (19). Consequently, K > 0 in (24).
The following Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions formulated for programme (18)
with h(x) = x1+x2¡1 ¸ 0 and xi ¸ 0; i = 1;2 constitute the necessary conditions
for a constrained Pareto-e±cient outcome:
¡®x1 + (2® ¡ 1)x2 + ¹ · 0 (31)
x1(¡®x1 + (2® ¡ 1)x2 + ¹) = 0 (32)
®x1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(2x2 + x1) + ¹ · 0 (33)
x2(®x1 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)(2x2 + x1) + ¹) = 0 (34)
x1 + x2 ¡ 1 ¸ 0 (35)
¹(x1 + x2 ¡ 1) = 0 (36)
Their solution results in several threads.
First, ¹ > 0.
a. x1 > 0; x2 > 0
From (32), (34), (36)
¹(®) =
6® ¡ 6®2 ¡ 1
3®

















or, approximately, for ® 2 (0:211; 0:789).
We have plotted in Figure 1 the values of the constraint's \shadow price"
¹ implied by the Pareto weight ®, as a function of the weight. The
dash-dotted (blue) line shows the values of ¹, for which a constrained
\interior" solution exists. Here, we mean interior if (x1;x2) belong to
the inside of the segment f(x1;x2) : x2 = ¡x1 + 1; x1 2 (0; 1)g. We no-
tice that the shadow price for the interior solutions diminishes when the
regulator's preferences become more de¯nite for one of the agents (i.e.,
® is away from the centre).












Figure 1: The shadow price in the constrained Pareto-e±ciency problem as a func-
tion of ®
.
The output values that maximise the Pareto program (18), under the









We observe that only for ® >
1
3
both outputs are positive, see the blue
line segments in this ¯gure. The corresponding payo®s for each player
are shown in the middle panel of Figure 2. The regulator's goal value,
which is a weighted sum of the agents' payo®s is shown in the bottom
panel.
b. x1 = 0; x2 > 0
From (36) x2 = 1 and from (34)
(1 ¡ ®)(¡2 ¢ 1) + ¹ = 0 (39)
thus ¹ = 2(1 ¡ ®). This combination of x1;x2;¹ does not satisfy (31),
hence there is no \corner" solution of the regulator's programme at x1 =
0; x2 = 1.




































Figure 2: Pareto-e±cient solutions as a function of ®.
c. x2 = 0; x1 > 0
From (36) x1 = 1 and from (32)
¡® + ¹ = 0 (40)
hence ¹ = ® > 0 for any ® 2 (0;1), see the solid (red) line in Figure 1.








We notice non-uniqueness of ¹(®) for ® 2 (0:211; 0:333) in Figure 1.
However, this non-uniqueness can be resolved if the regulator requires
non-negative, hence realisable, outputs for either agent (see (38)). If
18so, the solution is unique: for ® 2 (0; 0:333); x1 = 1;x2 = 0; for ® 2
(0:333; 0:789) the solution is given by (37). There though appears that
there is no solution for ® 2 (0:789; 1).
The resulting payo®s to the players and regulator's aim values are dis-
played in Figure 2 in middle and bottom panels, respectively.
² For ¹ = 0. We consider this case to examine the solution existence, or its
lack, in the interior of the set f(x1;x2) : x2 > ¡x1 + 1; x1 ¸ 0; x2 ¸ 0g.
a. The cases of x1 = 0; x2 = 1 and x1 = 1; x2 = 0 coincide with items (b.)
and (c.) above, for ® = 1 and ® = 0, respectively.
b. Assuming x1 > 0; x2 > 0 and using (32), (34) yields
¡®x1 + (2® ¡ 1)x2 = 0 (41)
(2® ¡ 1)x1 ¡ 2(1 ¡ ®)x2 = 0: (42)
This system has the zero solution that contradicts (35).








¢ = 6® ¡ 6®
2 ¡ 1 = 0 (43)















































obtain P = 0.
However, we do not expect the regulator to have their preferences be-
tween ¯rms set at exactly ® = ®s and will not delve into the singular
solution.
196.2.2 Su±cient conditions
To establish, for which ®;x1 and x2 the Pareto programme can be maximised we
need to analyse the shape of P(¢;¢) as a function of ®. This can be done easily by
examining Hessian and gradient of P(¢;¢), both as functions of ®. The formulae
are available from the authors. Here, for transparency of the analysis we present
3D snapshots of P(¢;¢), for three selected values of ®: 0.5,0.789 and 0.9, see Figure
3. The feasible region X = fx : x1 + x2 ¸ 1g is on the right hand side of the
coordinate system.
Figure 3: The shape of P(¢;¢) for selected values of ® (0.5,0.789 and 0.9).
We notice that P(¢;¢) is concave for all values of ®. However, the location of
the maximum changes. The left panel depicts the Pareto programme for ® = 0:5 <
0:789 and shows that it has a maximum in the \scarcity" region. So, the locus
of the constrained maxima coincides with the constraint. (The maximum will be
x1 = 1; x2 = 0 for ® · 0:333 but we do not show this ¯gure for brevity.)
The right panel of Figure 3 depicts the Pareto programme for ® = 0:9 > 0:789.
We see that the function is unbounded in the feasibility region for this value of
®. We can also see in the middle panel that the programme is \symmetrical"
around the region's frontier and infer that there is no ¯nite maximum of P(¢;¢) for
® > 0:789. Hence there is no unbounded solution to the Pareto programme for this
interval of ®. Consequently, the regulator's choices of ® 2 (0:789; 1) will not be
20implementable as coupled constraints equilibria.
We conclude that the Pareto optimal solutions for ® 2 (0:; 0:789) exist and are
unique. However, the solutions cannot be obtained for \large" values of ®, which
would have favoured the income generated by the ¯rst agent (the transportation
¯rm).
6.3 Which coupled constraints equilibria are available
Subsequently, existence and uniqueness of a coupled constraints' equilibrium for
r > 0 needs be established. For that purpose we compute pseudo-Hessian for the























2 + 10r ¡ 1 > 0 (47)
i.e.; 5 ¡ 2
p
6 < r < 5 + 2
p
6 or; approximately; 0:101 < r < 9:899: (48)
So, we know there exists an interval for r, for which the CCE exists and is unique.





and plot it in Figure 4.
Map (49) enables us to compute the largest ¹ ® that corresponds to the upper
end of interval (48). This is ¹ ® ¼ 0:583, the largest value of ®, for which a unique
equilibrium is guaranteed11. At the lower end of this interval is ® ¼ 0:191. We
notice that ® > 0 i.e., there are ® < ®, for which a Pareto solution exists. On the
other hand, ¹ ® < 0:789 i.e., ¹ ® is below the largest ®, for which the Pareto programme
possesses a solution.








, for which r(®) > 0.
The intersection12 is
® 2 (®; ¹ ®) ¼ (0:191; 0:583) (50)
11We notice that H > 0 is a su±cient condition for uniqueness and cannot exclude that unique-
ness may be achieved for r > 0 from outside the above interval.
12Notice that ® =
2
3





















> ¹ ® that is outside the interval, for which unique equilibria are guaranteed.











Figure 4: The map between ® and r.
that de¯nes the interval of ® for which r > 0 and such that the uniqueness of
equilibria is guaranteed.
We can see that as the regulator attaches more weight to the ¯rst ¯rm's payo®
i.e., if ® grows from ®, to ¹ ® (i.e., from 0.191 to 0.583), the preferential treatment
as measured by r, which diminishes marginal cost of the constraint's violation (see
(14)), becomes increasingly stronger. This appears logical: the more income from
¯rm 1 the regulator \wants", the smaller the marginal cost this ¯rm should face.
This enables us to see the dual function of weight r. On a one hand it stimulates
the ¯rst ¯rm's production by diminishing its marginal cost; on the other hand, it
motivates ¯rm 2 to produce because of the fear of punishment.
In summary, if ® 2 (0:191; 0:583), then 0:101 < r < 9:899 and (49) de¯nes a
relationship between a Pareto solution and CCE.
Recall, a value of ® \close" to 0 signi¯es that the second ¯rm's payo® is of more
value to the regulator than the ¯rst ¯rm's; an ® \close" to 1 means more importance
attached to ¯rst ¯rm's payo®. It becomes clear that because of the constraint (2),
the regulator cannot prioritise the second ¯rms' payo®s in some \extreme" fashion.
However, this does not preclude existence of the \corner" solution x1 = 1; x2 = 0,
that exists for any ® 2 (0:1910:333).




¼ 0:4082 2 (0:191; ¹ ®) that minimises the
regulator's programme (6), which is a convex function of ®, see Figure 2 third
panel. This suggests that the regulator might seek to implement an equilibrium
that corresponds to ¹ ®.
7 Concluding remarks
We have proved Theorem 5.1, which formulates the necessary conditions, under
which a constrained Pareto-e±cient solution can be supported by a coupled con-
straints equilibrium µ a la Rosen. Corollaries 5.1 and 5.2 provide the conditions for
the situations with no negative externalities and \nil" externalities, respectively.
The above constitute the mathematical conditions for a novel approach to the
solution of a politico-economic coordination problem. We have used a game theo-
retic framework that has allowed us to formulate this problem naturally as a coupled
constraints equilibrium. We have illustrated how to use Theorem 5.1 to solve the
problem.
We have concluded that if agents interact through positive and negative exter-
nalities, then the regulator's choices for his (or her) preferred solutions may exclude
some extreme values of the marginal rate of substitution between the ¯rms' payo®s.
Furthermore, we have obtained some quantitative results relevant to the con-
sidered example. The array of unique equilibria that can support the regulator's
choices is non symmetrical with respect to ® = 0:5 and exclude solutions, in which
the \public" ¯rm's payo® would have contributed more than 58% toward the reg-
ulator's programme. On the other hand, heavy preferences of the \private" ¯rm's
payo® (i.e., small ®) are also excluded. This suggests that the Pareto programmes
supported by coupled constraints equilibria are politically equilibrated and hence
acceptable to the stockholders.
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23Appendix
A Rosen's relative weights in IR
2
+
Consider a game with payo®s ¦1(e);¦2(e) that satisfy know that this game has a












> > > > =
> > > > ;
(51)
where ¸ ¸ 0 is the shadow price of the common constraint of type (2).












> > > > =
> > > > ;
(52)
where ¸0 > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier that corresponds to this choice or r.
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